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THE IM PACT OF THE FOIA ON NLRB 
DISCOVERY PROCEDURES 
Since the passage of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 1 in 
1967, in.any suits havt: bt:en brought against the National Labor 
Relations Board (hereinafter NLRB or Board) by citizens seeking 
to compel disclosure of its investigatory files. 2 The most sought-
after documents in such cases are witness statements or affidavits 
collected by the Board's field examiners prior to unfair labor prac-
tice heariqgs. 3 These statements are the primary source of the 
1 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV 1974). For other general analyses of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act; see K. Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. · 
761 (1967); Katz, Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1261 (1970); Koch, The Freedom of Information Act: Suggestions 
Jot Making Information Available to the Public, 32 MD. L. REv. 189 (1972); Kramer & 
Weinberg, The Freedom of Information Act, 63 GEO. L.J. 49 (1974); Nader, Freedom from 
Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1970); Project, 
Federal Administrative Law Developments-1971, 1972 DUKE L.J. 115; Project, Govern-
ment Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971 (1975); Note, The 
Freedom of Information Act: A Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 150 (1969); Note, 
The Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974: An Analysis, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
951 (1975). 
2 The Comptroller of the NLRB estimates that FOIA suits cost the Board $400,000 in 
1975. 27 LAB. L.J. 190 (1976). 
3 Id. Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U .S.C. § 158 (1970), defines an 
unfair labor practice as an interference with certain specified rights of employees by either 
an employer or a union. 
The NLRB has divided the United States into thirteen regions, each headed by a Regional 
Director, who is under the direct supervision of the General Counsel of the NLRB. An 
unfair labor practice charge may be filed by any person with the regional offices of the 
NLRB. 29 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1976). After the charge is investigated by a Board field examiner 
the Regional Director determines whether a complaint should be issued against the charged 
party. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1976). If the Regional Director decides 
that the charge is without merit, he may recommend that the complainant voluntarily 
withdraw the charge, or may dismiss it himself. 29 C.F.R. § 101.6 (1976). If the charging 
party is dissatisfied with the dismissal, it may appeal to the Board's General Counsel. The 
General Counsel may uphold the dismissal, or direct the Regional Director to proceed with 
the case. If the General Counsel upholds the dismissal, he must state the grounds for his 
decision. 29 C.F.R. § 102.19(c) (1976). 
When the General Counsel upholds the dismissal, the memoranda generated by his staff 
reflecting the decision-making process are discoverable. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
421 U.S. 132 (1975). Although the General Counsel's decision is not reviewable within the 
NLRB, discovery of the reasoning behind his decision may help appellants perceive stan- · 
<lards for successful appeals, and also give them grounds for seeking relief in the courts when 
it appears that the General Counsel's decision was arbitrary or capricious. Sarnoff & Falkin, 
The FOJA and the NLRB, 15 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 1267, 1286 (1974). 
If a complaint is issued, it must contain notice of the time and place of the scheduled 
hearing, as well as a description of the acts which constitute the alleged unfair labor 
practices. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 101.8 (1976). The Regional Director 
continues to investigate the charge, and if the matter cannot be settled, a Board attorney is 
appointed to P,resent the evidence in support of the complellnt. This occurs relatively 
476 
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Board's evidence against parties that have allegedly committed 
unfair labor practices. 4 
A prerequisite to filing a suit under the FOIA is the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies; in an unfair labor practice hearing, this 
means petitioning the Board for discovery. 5 The increase in the 
number of suits against the Board under the FOIA demonstrates a 
growing dissatisfa.ction with the Board's discovery procedures. 
This article will discuss the impact of the FOIA on the Board's 
policies and practices and will examine various factors which must 
be considered in applying the Act to the NLRB. 
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF NLRB DISCOVERY 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) contains no provi-
sions dealing specifically with discovery procedures. 6 Section 
lO(b) provides, however, that Board proceedings shall be con-
ducted in accordance with federal rules of evidence "so far as is 
practicable.'' 7 One court has interpreted this language to mean that 
the discovery procedures available under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are applicable in Board proceedings. 8 Most courts have 
decided, however, that section lO(b) of the NLRA does not pro-
vide for any particular discovery procedures and does not preclude 
the Board from promulgating its own discovery rules. 9 The Board's 
infrequently. In fiscal 1975; for instance, %.2 percent of all unfair labor practice cases were 
settled prior to a hearing. 40 NLRB ANN. REP. 5 (1975). In the event a hearing is required, 
an administrative law judge presides over the hearing and decides the case. 29 C.F.R. §§ 
101. I0(a), 102.34-.35 (1976). If neither party files an exception to the administrative law 
judge's decision, the Board automatically adopts his opinion. When an exception is filed, the 
Board will decide the case. 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(b) (1976) . 
• See NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL, UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS § 
10056.2 (Apr. 1975): "Whenever possible the charging party's case, if one exists, should be 
established through interviews with the charging party and with witnesses offered by the 
charging party." See also id. at § 10058.2: "The keystone of the investigation is the 
affidavit." (Emphasis in original). 
5 Vapor Blast Mfg. Co. v. Madden, 280 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 910 
(1%1). 
6 See generally Manoli & Joseph, The National Labor Relations Board and Discovery 
Procedures, 18 Ao. L. REV. 9 (1%6); Note, Labor Law-Pre-Hearing Discovery of Em-
ployee's Statements, 48 N.C.L. REV. 368 (1970). 
7 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970). The pertinent part of the statute provides: "Any such 
proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of 
evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rules of civil 
procedure for the district courts of the United States .... " 
8 McLain Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd on other 
grounds, 521 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1974). 
9 NLRB v. lnterboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 197-0); NLRB v. Leprino 
Cheese Co., 424 F.2d 184 (10th Cir. 1970); Electromec Design & Dev. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 
409 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968); Vapor Blast Mfg. Co. v. Madden, 280 F.2d 205 (7th 
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rules prohibit any discovery prior to the hearing, but allow disclo-
sure of witness statements after the witness has testified at the 
hearing. 10 NLRB regulations also prohibit Board employees from 
releasing information to the public without written permission from 
the Chairman of the NLRB or the Board's General Counsel until 
after the witness has testified. 11 Depositions are allowed only when 
witnesses are unable to testify at the hearing. 12 Administrative law 
judges have discretion to allow discovery when there is good cause 
shown,13 but have rarely done so. 14 
· Prior to the enactment of the FOIA, there were relatively few 
suits to compel discovery in unfair labor practice proceedings. 
When discovery requests did come to trial, most courts would 
overturn a denial of discovery only where the administrative law 
judge had abused his discretion, resulting in prejudice to the 
charged party .15 Under this ~tandard courts generally denied ac-
cess to Board files, 16 thereby discouraging requests for discovery. 
The leading ~ase in this period was NLRB v. Vapor Blast Manufac-
turing Company. 17 Vapor Blast resisted enforcement of an NLRB 
order, claiming that the Board's refusal to allow discovery of 
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 88 (1961); NLRB v. Globe Wireless, 193 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 
1951). 
10 29 C.F.R. § 102. I 18(b)(I) (1976). 
11 29 C.F.R. § 102. I 18(a)(2) (1976). 
12 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1976) specifies that all testimony is to be taken orally at the hearing 
unless th·ere is a showing of good cause why this cannot occur. 
13 29 C.F.R. § 102.30(a) (1976). 
14 See Electromec Design & Dev. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631,635 (9th Cir. 1969); 
NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 
955 (1968). 
15 See, e.g., NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968), where the court upheld the decision of the Board denying 
discovery, stating that even though the trial examiner had abused his discretion in denying 
the employer's petition to take depositions of potential witnesses, there was no obvious 
prejudice to the appealing party. Charged parties have succeeded in obtaining Board docu-
ments during enforcement proceedings in the federal courts of appeals. These decisions, 
however, concerned only the discoverability of Board material in federal courts, and did not 
deal with the validity of the Board's discovery procedure. Fusco v. Richard W. Kaese 
Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Shauffier v. Highway Truck Drivers & 
Helpers, Local 107, 196 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1960). 
16 See Electromec Design & Dev. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631,635 (9th Cir. 1969); 
NLRB v. Wichita Television Corp., 277 F.2d 579, 585 (10th Cir. i960); NLRB v. Gala-Mo 
Arts, Inc., 232F.2d 102, 106(8thCir.1956); NLRBv. Globe Wireless, 193 F.2d748, 751 (9th 
Cir. 1951). 
17 287 F.2d 402 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961). Vapor Blast had sued to force 
disclosure of witness affidavits prior to the unfair labor practice hearing. The Seventh 
Circuit held, however, that Vapor Blast had to exhaust its administrative remedies before it 
could seek relief in the courts. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co. v. Madden, 280 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 
1960), cert. denied, 364. U.S. 910 (1961). Vapor Blast then appealed to the Regional Director 
and simultaneously petitioned the General Counsel for access to the affidavits. The General 
Counsel ultimately rejected both the de novo petition and the appeal, and Vapor Blast 
subsequently lost on the merits in the unfair labor practice hearing. When Vapor Blast 
refused to comply with the Board's order, the Board brought enforcement proceedings in 
the Court of Appeals. 
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witness affidavits constituted a denial of procedural due process .18 
In enforcing the Board's order, the court held that the discovery 
rules promulgated by the NLRB did not per se violate Vapor 
Blast's constitutional right to procedural due process, and noted 
that the Board possessed broad power to formulate rules to guide 
its internal administration. 19 The court, by applying the rational 
basis test, found that the confidentiality of employee affidavits was 
necessary to preclude employer retaliation and to insure full dis-
closure to field examiners. 20 Moreover, it held that section lO(b) of 
the NLRA did not require the adoption of the entire discovery 
procedure contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
court stressed that the Board had the responsibility of determining 
whether full disclosure was practical in unfair labor practice hear-
ings. 21 Finally, although the court recognized that the Board's 
insistence on compliance with discovery regulations might consti-
tute an abuse of discretion where a party made a sufficient showing 
of need for the documents, it held that Vapor Blast had not demon-
strated that it was "prejudiced, surprised, or in any way put at a 
disadvantage" because of the denial of discovery. 22 
II. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS 
The legislative history of section IO(b) provides little insight into 
whether Congress intended NLRB discovery procedures. to be 
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. During the 
congressional debates on the Taft-Hartley Act,23 Senator Taft 
criticized the tendency of administrative law judges to admit virtu-
ally anything into evidence, thereby causing great delays in the 
adjudication of unfair labor practices. 24 As · a result of Senator 
Taft's comments section lO(b) was amended to establish 
guidelines, based upon the rules of evidence in use in federal 
district courts, for limiting what evidence could be admitted. 25 The 
18 287 F.2d 402, 405 (1961). 
19 The court noted that "[the Board] has determined that it is necessary to proper 
administration to stamp as confidential all documents in its possession." Id. at 407 (em-
phasis added). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 408. Later cases adopting this reasoning include Electromec Design & Dev. Co. 
v. NLRB. 409 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273 
(5th Cir. 1967); Trojan Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB. 356 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1966). See NLRB 
v. Wichita Televison Inc., 277 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Gala-Mo Arts, Inc., 232 
F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1956), for decisions which preceded Vapor Blast, but applied similar 
reasoning. 
23 Pub. L. No. 80-101, § IO(b), 61 Stat. 146 (1947). 
24 93 CoNG. REC. 6860 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft). 
2s Id.-
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"so far as is practicable" phrase was inserted to allow administra-
tive law judges "considerable discretion" as to what evidence was 
admissible. 26 There is no indication that Congress anticipated the 
considerable effect that application of these evidentiary rules 
would have on the Board's discovery procedures. 
An agency's administrative procedures must satisfy the re-
m1irPmPnt<: of nror.Pclnr:::i 1 cl11P nrorp,;;,;; 27 ron .. iclPr:::ition,;; of nro-,-- ---------- --- r--------- ... --- r--------· _ _,,_...,.....,, _____ ...... _. .......... --- r---
cedural due process traditionally involve a balancing test between 
the government's interest in the procedures adopted and the citi7 
zen's interest in greater safeguards.28 In applying due process 
standards to NLRB discovery rules, the courts must consider the 
competing interests of charged parties, employee-witnesses, and 
the NLRB. The charged party is primarily concerned with having a 
full and fair hearing.~9 In deciding whether NLRB hearings satisfy 
due process standards, the court must consider the unfairness to 
the charged party who may be tried without having been fully 
apprised of the circumstances sµrrounding the alleged unfair labor 
practice.30 Moreover, denial of discovery can deprive a charged 
party of the opportunity to adequately prepare a defense. 31 With-
out discovery of witness statements, for example, the charged 
party may be unable to effectively cross-examine the Board's 
witnesses.32 Moreover, the charged party may not be allowed 
sufficient time to gather evidence with which to rebut testimony, 
thus his chances of prevailing at the hearing would be greatly 
diminished. 33 Due process also requires that the courts consider 
the severity of the punishment resulting from an adverse finding. 34 
The harsher the penalties, the greater the amount of due process 
protection that is required. 35 Since the sanctions imposed by the 
NLRB are relatively slight, ranging from cease and desist orders to 
reinstatement with back pay, 36 there may not be a compelling need 
to provide extensive procedural safeguards in Board hearings. 
Drawing an analogy between NLRB proceedings and criminal 
26 Id. 
27 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970). 
•s Id. 
29 Id. at 268. 
3° Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,268 (1970). (The Court stated that in proceedings 
to deny welfare recipients their benefits, both a letter and personal meetings were effective 
to fully inform the recipients of the nature of the proceedings.). 
31 McLain Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd on other 
grounds, 521 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1974). 
32 Barnes & Noble Bookstores v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2169 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
33 Id. 
34 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951). 
35 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 
(1969). 
36 29 U .S.C. § 160(c) (1970). 
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trials, many courts have argued that the discovery rule.contained in 
the Jencks Act37 should apply in NLRB proceedings.38 The Jencks 
Act provides that a witness affidavit may be disclosed only after 
the witness has testifed in court. Courts favorin·g the application of 
this principle in NLRB hearings have argued that Congress could 
not have intended charged parties to have greater rights of discov-
ery than criminal defendants. 39 This view, however, does not con-
sider that the more limited rights to discovery in the criminal 
setting are offset by procedural safeguards not available to respon-
dents in agency proceedings, such as the right to a trial by jury and 
a greater burden of proof that must be satisfied before the defen-
dant can be found guilty. 40 
The employee-witness has an interest in protection from retalia-
tion by his employer or union. 41 Although section 8 of the NLRA 42 
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer or union to 
retaliate against an employee for giving testimony, employers and 
unions may be able to fabricate "good cause" for their actions.43 
Moreover, forcing an employee to file an unfair labor practice 
charge to enforce his rights places a heavy burden on those who 
give testimony to Board agents. Indeed, employer retaliation 
against employees who provide information to Board agents may 
tend to have a chilling effect on other potential witnesses who are 
thus discouraged from asserting their rights. 
The interests of the Board are also undercut by employer and 
union retaliation because witness statements comprise the eviden-
37 18 U .S.C. § 3500(a) (1970) provides: 
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report in 
the possession of the United States which was made by a government witness or 
prospective government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of 
subpoena, discovery or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examin-
ation in the trial of the case. 
The Jencks Act was passed to regulate discovery procedures in criminal trials. The 
specific goals of the Act were to limit defendants' discovery to the signed witness state-
ments, and to preclude any discovery of such statements prior to the witness' testimony in 
court. The purpose of the legislation was to limit the effects of the Supreme Court decision in 
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), which ordered the production of FBI reports 
containing the requested witness statements. See S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1957). 
38 See NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Vapor 
Blast Mfg. Co .. 287 F.2d 402 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961); Barceloneta Shoe 
Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967). 
39 Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967). 
40 M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 411 (1969). 
41 NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402,407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 
(1961). 
42 29 u.s.c. § 158 (1970). 
43 Employers may coerce their employees in many ways. Besides discharge, employees 
could be transferred to less desirable or lower paying jobs, harassed, ostracized by fellow 
employees, or denied promotions, bonuses, or other fringe benefits. Unions might also 
coerce members who give testimony against them, either by informally ostracizing the 
members or by forcing employers to discharge them .. 
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tiary basis of the Board's case in unfair labor practice hearings. 44 
Any premature release of such statements which might deter po-
tential witnesses or unfairly benefit the charged party by revealing 
the Board's case would interfere with the Board's legitimate inter-
est in prosecuting unfair labor practices. Since the Board releases 
witness statements immediately after testimony, 45 however, the 
Board's present discovery policy merely delays, not eliminates, 
the possibility of retaliation. 46 Moreover, in many cases a charged 
party may know who the witnesses for the Board will be before 
th.ey testify. In sum, the fact that witness statements have been 
released may not contribute to the employer's or union's ability to 
retaliate. 47 
In addition to the relative interests of the parties, there are other 
factors that may affect the application of due process standards. 
The nature of the requested materials may be an important addi-
tional factor. 48 The sworn affidavit of a person who will later be 
called as a witness will not usually differ substantially from the 
testimony at the hearing, nor will it reveal the identity of one who 
would otherwise have remained anonymous. Thus, the disclosure 
of these documents would have few adverse consequences to 
either witnesses or the Board, but would aid charged parties in 
preparing their cases. O_n the other hand, the information contained 
in a field examiner's notes are likely to consist of the opinions or 
legal theories of the interviewer and thus offer an unfair advantage 
to the charged party if disclosed. 
A second factor to be considered is whether the information is 
helpful or damaging to the charged party. By knowingly withhold-
ing a statement which tends to vindicate the charged party, the 
Board violates basic principles of fairness and undermines the 
validity of the hearings. There is also no incentive to retaliate 
against an employee for presenting favorable evidence. 49 If the 
statement is damaging to the charged party, the issue is less clear. 
While the possibility of retaliation exists, disclosure of the state-
ment may make the strength of the Board's case more apparent, 
• 
44 See note 4 supra. 
45 See note IO supra. 
46 See Barnes & Noble Bookstores v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2169 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
47 The recognition a witness receives by having his statement released may afford some 
protection. In order to prevail on a charge of retaliation the Board need only show that the 
employer suspected that the employee spoke to Board agents. Maple City Stamping Co., 200 
NLRB 743, 759 (1972). The release of the witness' statement informs the employer that the 
employee has cooperated with the Board. If retaliation ensues, the Board will have no 
trouble establishing the employer's knowledge. Where the Board's burden has been so 
greatly simplified, the employer may be inhibited from retaliatory action. See generally 
NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972). 
48 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2072 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
49 See Temple-Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2915 (E.D. Tex. 1976). 
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and persuade the charged party to settle the matter more informally 
without a full-fledged hearing. 50 
Finally, the relationship of the witness to the charged party is an 
important factor. When the witness is not susceptible to retaliation 
there is no compelling reason to deny discovery .51 For example, 
the Board should permit discovery when the witness is a union 
official testifying against an employer, a supervisor testifying 
against a union, or a nonemployee bystander unrelated to either 
side. 
Ill. POST-FOIA DISCOVERY 
A. Background of the 1967 Act 
Prior to the passage of the FOIA, federal agencies were generally 
able to withhold information from the public.52 Relying on the 
vague provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),53 
the agencies justified nondisclosure on the grounds that the public 
interest required secrecy or that there was good cause for keeping 
the material confidential.54 The agencies also relied upon the APA 
requirement that a citizen be an interested party, properly and 
directly concerned with the requested information, to receive gov-
ernment documents. 55 
Responding to widespread discontent over government secrecy, 
Congress amended the APA in 1967 by enacting the Freedom of 
Information Act, 56 with the declared purpose of permitting greater 
access to government documents.57 In determining which docu-
ments should be withheld from the public, the FOIA seeks to 
establish a uniform standard for disclosure by balancing the public 
interest in obtaining information against the confidentiality inter-
ests of the agencies and individuals involved. 58 The FOIA requires 
50 See Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2645, 2647 (W.D. Tenn. 1976); 
Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Nash, 90 LRRM 3138, 3144 (D.S.C. 1975). 
51 Jd. 
52 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965). 
53 60 Stat. 238 (1946) provides in pertinent part: "Save as otherwise directed by statute, 
matters of official record shall in accordance with published rules be made available to 
persons properly and directly concerned except for information held confidential for good 
cause found." 
54 H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1966); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., lsi 
Sess. 5 (1%5). 
55 H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1966); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 5 (1965). 
56 See 5 U .S.C. § 552 (1967); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1965). 
57 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1965). 
58 120 CONG. REc. 517,033-34 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Hart). 
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full disclosure of all agency material on demand, except for nine 
specific categories of documents. 59 The agency has the burden of 
demonstrating that material comes within one of the exemptions,60 
and an agency's refusal to supply information may be challenged in 
federal district court. 61 
The Board has relied on only two of the specified exemptions in 
virtually all of the FOIA suits in which it has been a defendant;· 
exemption 5, which deais with inter- and intra-agency memoranda, 
and exemption 7, which covers investigatory files of law enforce-
ment agencies. 62 
B. Exemption 5 
Exemption 5 provides that inter-agency and intra-agency 
memoranda or letters which would not otherwise be available in 
litigation are exempt from the disclosure requirements of the 
FOIA. 63 Congress enacted this. provision because it feared that 
disclosure of agency memora·nda would inhibit frank communica-
tion between and within agencies and impair agencies' operations 
by revealing their legal or investigative theories. 64 
The courts have been divided over whether the Board can rely 
on exemption 5 to deny. disclosure of witness statements. 65 In 
59 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970). See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1967). The 
nine exempt categories pertain to documents which are (I) required by Executive order to be 
kept secret, (2) internal personnel rules, (3) exempted by another statute, (4) trade secrets, 
(5) inter- or intra-agency memoranda, (6) personnel and medical files, (7) investigatory files 
of law enforcement agencies, (8) condition reports of agencies regulating financial institu-
tions, and (9) geological or geophysical data. 
60 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970). 
61 Id. 
62 See Fuselier & Moeller, NLRB Investigatory Records: Disclosure. Under the Freedom 
of Information Act, JOU. RICH. L. REV. 541, 544 (1976). For a general dicussion of the 
issues raised by the Board in FOIA suits, see Sarnoff & Falkin, The Freedom of Information 
Act and the NLRB, 15 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 1267 (1974); Note, Backdooring the 
NLRB: Use and Abuse of the Amended FO/Afor Administrative Discovery, 8 LOY. CHI. L. 
J. 145 (1976). 
63 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970) provides: "This section does not apply to matters that are 
.•. (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available 
by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; .... " 
64 Decisions allowing disclosure under exemption 5 include Amerace Corp. v. NLRB, 92 
LRRM 3497 (W.D. Tenn. 1976); Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2645 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1976); Local 30, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 
520 (E.D. Pa. 1976); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2072 (C.D. Cal. 1976); 
Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Deering 
Milliken, Inc. v. Nash, 90 LRRM 3138 (D.S.C. 1975). Courts denying disclosure on the basis 
of exemption 5 include Hook Drugs v. NLRB, 91 LRRM 2797 (S. D. Ind. 1976); Atlas Indus. 
v. NLRB, 91 LRRM 2676 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Jamco Int'I. Inc. v. NLRB, 91 LRRM 2446 
(N.D. Okla. 1976); Marathon LeToumeau Co. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D. Miss. 
1976). 
65 See H. Rep. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. JO (1966). 
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Temple-Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 66 the court held that witness state-
ments did not fall within the scope of exemption 5 because they 
were not inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda. The court noted 
that witness statements were generated by private citizens, not 
transmitted from one government employee to another.67 The 
court also observed that no evidence of the deliberative processes 
of the Board were contained in the statements. 68 Similarly, in 
Amerace Corporation v. NLRB, 69 the court denied the Board's 
right to withhold witness statements, finding that neither estab-
lished precedent nor the legislative history of the FOIA indicated 
that purely factual informati(?n, such as that contained in witness 
statements, could be withheld from the public under exemption 
5_10 
In Jamco International, Inc. v. NLRB, 71 however, the court 
held that witness statements, field examiner's notes, trial prepara-
tion materials of field examiners and attorneys, and similar docu-
ments gathered as evidence come within exemption 5. The court 
argued that exemption 5 was intended to employ the same criteria 
as Rule 26(b )(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 72 which 
provides that purely factual material, if prepared in contemplation 
of litigation, constitutes an attorney's work product and is not 
normally subject to discovery. 73 
The decision whether an agency document is discoverable under 
exemption 5 should involve a two-step determination. First, the 
courts should determine whether the requested material is an inter-
or intra-agency memorandum.-lf it is not an agency memorandum, 
it should be disclosed. If it is an agency memorandum, the courts 
must decide if it would ordinarily be discoverable in civil litigation. 
In making this determination, courts have considered whether the 
66 92 LRRM 2915 (E.D. Tex. 1976). After being charged with an unfair labor practice, 
Temple-Eastex sought witness statements from the Board. Disclosure was denied by the 
Regional Director and the General Counsel. Temple-Eastex then initiated a suit under the 
FOIA. 
61 Id. at .2917. 
68 Id. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89-90 (1973). The Supreme Court has endorsed a 
narrow reading of exemption 5 based on the distinction between materials which contain 
primarily factual information and those which reflect the deliberative process of the agency. 
69 92 LRRM 3497 (W.D. Tenn. 1976). 
70 Id. at 3498. This interpretation of exemption 5 has been adopted by courts in FOIA suits 
involving other agencies. In Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1976), for example, 
two private citizens sought disclosure of the federal government's development plans for a 
supersonic transport aircraft. The defendant, director of the Office of Science and Technol-
ogy, refused to·comply with the request, claiming that the report was an inter-agency 
memorandum. exempt from disclosure under exemption 5. The court noted that the purpose 
of the exemption is to encourage a free exchange of ideas during the policymaking process. 
The court found, however, that this rationale did not apply to "purely factual or investiga-
tive reports." 448 F.2d at 1007. See also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA 478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973). 
71 91 LRRM 2446 (N.D. Okla. 1976). 
12 Id. at 2449. 
73 28 U.S.C. Rule 26(b)(3) (1970). 
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document was generated by agency personnel or by private citi-
zens. 74 A document which does not originate in an agency is not 
considered to be an inter- or intra-agency memorandum. 75 Courts 
have also considered the relationship of the document to the de-
liberative or policymaking functions of the agency. 76 If the material 
is an integral part of such processes, it is considered an agency 
memorandum, but where the material is purely factual,. it is not 
vie\.ved as an agency memorandum and disclosure has been ai-
lowed. 77 
If the document is found to be an agency memorandum, a second 
determination is required to decide the document's discoverability. 
If the memorandum would be "otherwise available in litigation," 
discovery is permitted. 78 
In Jamco, the court made the two determinations in reverse 
order, finding that the witness statements constituted attorney 
work products before determining whether they were agency 
memoranda. If the court had first considered whether the docu-
ment was an agency memorandum, it would never have reached 
the "available in litigation" test, because witness statements do 
not qualify as inter- or intra-agency memoranda under exemption 
5. 79 Such statements neither originate with NLRB personnel, nor 
do they involve policymaking or deliberative functions; they are, 
ostensibly, factual documents. 
C. Exemption 7 
The other exemption relied upon by the NLRB in defending 
FOIA actions to discover witness statements is exemption 7. 80 As 
74 See Wu v. National Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. i972); Soucie 
v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 
2586 (N.D. Ala. 1976). 
75 See H. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966): "[A] full and frank exchange of 
opinions would be impossible if all internal communications were made public." (Emphasis 
added). . 
76 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973); National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, 516 F.2d 1229, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Soucie v. David, 448 
F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871,874 (W.D. Wash. 1972). 
77 Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077-78 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also EPA v. Mink, 410 
U.S. 73, 89 (1973); Tennesseean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 
1972); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935,939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 
(1970). The policy-fact distinction is also supported by the legislative history of the FOIA. 
H. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong:, 2d Sess. 10(1966). See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
9 (1965). 
78 The "available in litigation" test, as applied to NLRB discovery, has generally focused 
on the attorney work product exemption. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 
(1975); Jamco Int'I, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 LRRM 2446 (N.D. Okla. 1976). In proceedings 
involving other agencies it has been held that the "availaole in litigation" standard parallels 
civil discovery rules. Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 
1975); Schwartz v. IRS, 511 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
79 See notes 69-78 and accompanying text supra. 
•
0 See note 62 and accompanying text supra. 
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originally enacted, it provided that information in the investigative 
files of law enforcement agencies, except that which would other-
wise be available in litigation, was exempt from the disclosure 
requirements of the FOIA.81 Congress created this exemption to 
ensure that law enforcement agencies would be able to present as 
strong a case as possible in court. 82 Although the FOIA was de-
signed to encourage disclosure,83 courts initially adopted a broad 
interpretation of exemption 7 in suits against the NLRB. 84 In the 
first case decided under the FOIA, Barceloneta Shoe Corporation 
v. Compton, 85 the court held that witness statements were exempt 
from disclosure under exemption 7. 86 Comparing NLRB witness 
statements to statements given to FBI agents, the court asserted 
that the former were within the scope of the law enforcement 
investigatory files definition. 87 The court looked to the Jencks 
Act88 and found that neither it nor any other law required produc-
tion of the witness statements.89 Subsequent decisions adopted th_e 
Barceloneta court's interpretation of exemption 7 without closely 
examining its rationale. 90 This approach resulted in the per se 
81 5 U .S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970). This exemption originally provided: "This section does not 
apply to matters that are-
... (7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent 
available by law to a party other than an agency; .... " 
82 120 CONG. REc. 517,034 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Hart). 
83 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965). . 
84 Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 4n (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 
(1974); Clement Bros. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1%9); Electromec Design 
& Dev. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1969); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. 
Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967). 
85 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1976). 
86 The Memorandum of Decision and Order in the Barceloneta case was issued after only 
one working day of preparation so that the order could take effect before the unfair labor 
practice hearing. 271 F. Supp. at 591, 593. Unfortunately, subsequent decisions adopted the 
Barce/oneta court's interpretation of the FOIA •without carefully evaluating its hastily 
conceived analysis. 
The court, as an alternative basis for denying disclosure, held that witness statements 
were exempt under the invasion of privacy provision. 271 F. Supp. at 594. See 5 U.S.C. § 
552(b)(6) (1970). This exemption provides: "This section does not apply to matters that are 
... (6) personnel and medical files and similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute 
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; .... " This provision applies to all 
government documents, not merely investigatory files of law enforcement agencies, and is 
similar to _the present exemption 7(C). 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(c). The Board has relied more 
often on exemption 7(C) than exemption 6. See notes 147-55 and accompanying text infra. 
87 271 F. Supp. 591. 593 (D.P.R. 1967). 
88 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1970). See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra. 
89 271 F. Supp. 591, 593 (D. P.R. 1967). The court also relied on the possibility of employer 
retaliation and its chilling effect on testimony in subsequent investigations. Id. at 594. 
90 Wellman Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 430-31 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
834 (1974); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir.), stay denied, 419 U.S. 1204 
(1971); Capital Cities Communications. Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971, 975 (N.D. Cal. 
1976); Philadelphia Newspapers. Inc. v. NLRB, 343 F. Supp. 1176. 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1972); 
Clement Bros. Co .. Inc. v. NLRB. 282 F. Supp. 540. 542 (N.D. Ga. 1968), enforced. 407 
F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1969). Barceloneta was followed outside the NLRB setting as well. See 
Center for Nat'! Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v. Weinberger. 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974); Dillow v. Brinegar. 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (percuriam). cert. denied. 419 
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denial of all open investigatory files. In Wellman Industries, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 91 for example, the employer sought witness statements 
from the Board during an unfair labor practice hearing. In denying 
disclosure the court rejected a "balancing of equities" approach,92 
finding that the statements were part of an open investigatory file93 
and therefore per se nondisclosable. 94 
Dissatisfied with this broad judicial interpretation of exemption 
7, 95 Congress amended the FOIA in I 974 to narrow the scope of 
exemption 7 .96 Criticizing the prior judicial interpretation of 
exemption 7 as creating a "stone wall" to disclosure, Senator 
Hart, the author of the amendment, explained that its purpose was 
to preclude the per se denial of discovery of investigatory files97 
and to require the courts to decide each case on its own merits 
U.S. 974 (1974); Weisberg v. Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 
Aspin v. Dep't of Defense, 348 F. Supp. 1081 (D.D.C. 1972), affd, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 
1973); Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591, 593 (D. Del. 1972), affd, 479 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 
1973); Benson v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 (D. Neb. 1970); Consumers Union, 
Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Cooney v. Sun Ship-
building & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708, 712 (E.D. Pa. 1%8). 
•
1 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1974). 
92 /d. at 429. 
93 Open investigatory files consist of material gathered in preparation for litigation which 
.is not yet complete. Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 45 
U.S.L.W. 3251 (1976). Once all reasonably foreseeable litigation has ended, the files are 
designated "closed." 
94 490 F.2d 427, 429-30 (4th Cir. 1974). The witness statements sought were gathered for 
an earlier proceeding concerning a representation election. Wellman contested the results of 
the election by refusing to bargain with the union and raising the invalidity of the election 
as a defense to the resulting unfair labor practice charge. Wellman's contention that the . 
statements were not part of an open investigatory file was rejected by the court as an 
excessively narrow interpretation of exemption 7. 
95 In response to a question from Senator Kennedy, Senator Hart explicitly stated that the 
Amendments were intended to overrule such cases as Center for Nat'! Policy Review on 
Race and Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 
1194 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974); Weisberg v. 
Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); 
Aspin v. Dep't of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 120 CoNG. REC. 517,033 (1974). 
96 5 U .S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. V 1975). As amended, exemption 7 provides: 
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-
... (7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to 
the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement 
proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudica-
tion, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the 
identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal 
law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency 
conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential infor-
mation furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative 
techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law 
enforcement personnel .... 
97 120 CONG. REC. 517,033 (1974). During the debates on the 1974 Amendments Senator 
Hart summarized the purpose of the 1974 Amendments: 
Recently, the courts have interpreted the seventh exception to the Freedom of 
Information Act to be applied whenever an agency can show that the document 
sought is an investigatory file compiled for law enforcement purposes-a stone wall 
at that point. The court would have the exemption applied without the need of the 
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without resorting to judicially-created "wooden and mechanical" 
rules.98 
As part of the congressional effort to aid the courts in deciding 
FOIA suits on a case-by-case basis, the 1974 Amendments provided 
that courts had the right to make in camera inspections of all 
requested documents prior to ruling on disclosure.99 This provision 
was a reaction to cases holding that no such right existed under the 
original FOIA .100 In camera inspection allows the court to weigh 
the interests of the parties and to insure that no disclosed informa-
tion will unduly impinge on the interests of an individual or agency. 
The 1974 Amendments have stipulated requests for disclosure of 
NLRB documents, especially witness statements. 101 Adhering to 
its traditional policy, however, the Board has resisted disclosure of 
its documents. 102 Although the courts have been more willing to 
compel disclosure under the 1974 Amendments than under the 
original FOIA, 103 a majority of courts have upheld the Board's 
policy of nondisclosure. 104 
Id. 
The exemption most effectively used by the Board is exemption 
agency to show why the disclosure of the particular document should not be 
made .... 
. . . Let me clarify the instances in which nondisclosure would obtain: First, 
wh~re the production of a record would interfere with enforcement procedures. 
This would apply whenever the Government's case in court-a concrete prospec-
tive law enforcement proceeding-would be harmed by the premature release of 
evidence or information not in the possession of known or potential defendants. 
This would apply also where the agency could show that the disclosure of the 
!nfor~ati~n would substantially harm such proceedings by impeding any necessary 
mvest1gat1on before the proceeding. In determining whether or not the information 
to be released will interfere with a law enforcement proceeding it is only relevant to 
make such determination in the context of the particular enforcement proceeding. 
98 Id. at 517,034. 
99 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(b) (Supp. V 1975). However, in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), 
the Supreme Court ruled that when a document is classified as "top secret" by Executive 
Order or through the President's delegated authority, courts have no right to in camera 
inspection of the classified documents. 
100 Aspin v. Dep't of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Weisberg v. Dep't of 
Justice, 489 F.2d I 195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). See also Frankel 
v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972). 
101 27 LAB. L.J. 190 (1976). See note 4 and accompanying text supra. 
102 27 LAB. L.J. 190 (1976) (statement of Chairwoman Murphy). The NLRB has not 
amended its regulations concerning disclosure, 29 C.F.R. § 102.118 (1976), indicating that 
the policy of nondisclosure is still in force. 
103 See Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2586 (N .D. Ala. 1976); Barnes & 
Noble Bookstores v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2169 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
NLRB, 92 LRRM 2072 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
10
• Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3251 
(1976); Goodfriend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 
Goodfriend Western Corp. v. NLRB, 45 U .S.L. W. 3306 (1976); Climax Molybdenum Co. v. 
NLRB, 92 LRRM 3466 (10th Cir. 1976), Gimbel Bros. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2733 (E.D. Pa. 
1976); Marathon LeTourneau v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Pacific Photo 
Type, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2560 (D. Haw. 1976); Atlas Indus. v. NLRB, 91 LRRM 2676 
(N.D. Ohio 1976). 
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7(A), which allows agencies to withhold investigatory files com-
piled for law enforcement purposes if disclosure would interfere 
with their enforcement proceedings .105 The courts have generally 
upheld nondisclosure of witness statements under exemption 7(A), 
noting the danger of retaliation against witnesses, the possible 
prejudice to the Board's case, and the chilling effect on future 
investigations. 106 
The leading case dealing with exemption 7(A) is Title Guarantee 
Company v. NLRB, 101 in which the Second Circuit held that wit-
ness statements in pending unfair labor practice proceedings were 
exempt from disclosure. Acknowledging that the 1974 amendments 
were intended to increase disclosure by narrowing the exemption, 
the court, nevertheless, noted that the legislative history distin-
guished between open and closed investigatory files .108 Since the 
adoption of the I 974 Amendments, closed files have generally been 
held to be disclosable. 109 
Open files were per se nondisclosable under the original 
FOIA, 110 and the Title Guarantee court found that the 1974 
amendments were not intended by Congress to alter the disclosa-
bility of open files .111 Moreover, the court stated that disclosure of 
witness statements prior to testimony would necessarily interfere 
with the Board's enforcement proceedings by revealing the 
Board's case in advance, thereby allowing charged parties to de-
velop defenses which might permit unfair labor practices to go 
unremedied. In the court's view, disclosure would also inhibit 
potential witnesses from giving information to the Board for fear of 
retaliation.11 2 Finally, the court asserted that Congress could not 
have intended to alter NLRB discovery procedures by a "back-
door" amendment to the FOIA. In view of the delicate balance 
105 5 U .S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (Supp. V 1975). 
10
• See Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3251 
(1976); Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 3466 (10th Cir. 1976); Goodfriend 
Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (I st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Goodfriend Western 
Corp. v. NLRB, 45 U.S.L.W. 3306 (1976); Marathon LeTourneau Co. v. NLRB, 414 F. 
Supp. 1074 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Sealand Terminal Corp. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2952 (S.D. Miss. 
1976). See notes 23-51 and accompanying text supra. 
107 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3251 (1976). 
10
• Id. at 492. See note I 12 infra. 
109 Id. at 490. 
11° Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Wellford v. 
Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971); Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591 (D. Del. 1972); afj'd 
per curiam. 479 F.2d 317 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1024 (1973). 
111 Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 45 U.S.L.W. 3251 
(1976). See Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 430-31 (4th Cir.). cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 834 (1974). 
112 534 F.2d at 491. The court rejected a third basis for interference; namely, that witness 
statements constituted attorney work products. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text 
supra. Investigative material other than witness statements was not found to be per se 
nondi sclosable. · 
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obtained by the NLRB in labor-management relations, it was un-
likely that the Board's discovery procedures were meant to be 
affected by a statute dealing with agency disclosure in general. 113 
The reasoning of the Title Guarantee court with respect to 
exemption 7(A) was expressly adopted in Goodfriend Western 
Corporation v. NLRB. 114 The First Circuit denied disclosure of 
witness statements, specifically rejecting the district court's at-
tempt to accommodate the interests of the charged party by allow-
ing disclosure twenty-four hours prior to the hearing. 115 The court 
noted that it was more efficient for the Board, rather than the 
court, to make a case-by-case determination of what information 
was disclosable. 116 The court also stated that it was not the intent 
of Congress to require courts to hear every request for disclo-
sure .117 The Tenth Circuit reached a similar result in Climax 
Molybdenum Company v. NLRB, 118 where it held that the 1974 
Amendments applied only to closed investigatory files, and that 
Congress did not intend to alter Wellman and its progeny. 119 The 
court also rejected a case-by-case adjudication of NLRB disclosure 
proceedings arising under the FOIA, relying on a presumption that 
there is interference in enforcement proceedings whenever open 
investigatory files are re leased .120 
Some courts have interpreted the 1974 Amendments differently. 
In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. NLRB, 121 for example, the 
court ordered disclosure of witness statements prior to an unfair 
labor practice hearing, finding that they did not come within 
exemption 7(A). An important factor in the decision was the fact 
that the witnesses involved were not susceptible to retaliation 
because they were nonemployee union officers. 122 The court ob-
served, however, that where employer retribution was a possibil-
ity, nondisclosure of witness statements prior to the hearings could 
only delay retaliation since the employer would receive the state-
ments immediately after the hearing. 123 The court rejected the 
Board's contention that disclosure would prevent it from obtaining 
113 Id. at 491-92. 
11
• 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3306 (1976). 
115 The district court contended that the twenty-four hour period would give the charged 
party time for adequate pre-hearing preparation without creating an opportunity for retalia-
tion against the witnesses. Goodfriend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 411 F. Supp. 454, 458 (D. 
Mass. 1976). 
116 535 F.2d at 147. 
111 Id. 
118 92 LRRM 3466 (10th Cir. 1976). 
119 Id. at 3467-68. 
120 Id. at 3468. 
121 92 LRRM 2072 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
122 See note 48 and accompanying text supra. 
123 92 LRRM at 2075. See note 46 and accompanying text supra. 
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evidence in the future due to the chilling· effect on potential wit-
nesses, and would make it more difficult to prevail against charged 
parties if the Board's strategies were revealed prior to the hearing. 
Relying on the legislative history of the 1974 Amendments, the 
court noted that investigatory files are not exempt per se and that 
an agency must satisfy the burden of proof by showing that a 
specific harm to its enforcement proceedings would result from 
disclosure. 124 Emphasizing that the Board's position was tan-
tamount to a return to the "wooden and mechanical" standards 
prevalent before the adoption of the 1974 Amendments, 125 the 
court adopted a case-by-case approach126 involving in camera 
inspection of the files .127 
Similarly, in Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Nash 128 the court, after 
discussing the legislative history of the FOIA, concluded that 
agencies relying on exemption 7(A) must demonstrate specific 
harm to its enforcement efforts. In rejecting a claim under exemp-
tion 7(A), the court declared that it would be directly contrary to 
the spirit of the 1974 amendments to refuse disclosure simply 
because the Board's own regulations did not allow discovery in an 
NLRB proceeding. 129 The court also observed that disclosure of 
the requested information could only have a beneficial effect on the 
outcome of the proceedings. 130 
In Temple-Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB 131 the court adopted a middle 
position, balancing the various interests involved. The court noted 
that witness statements of those hostile to the charged party should 
be withheld to protect the witnesses from retaliation. The court 
held, however, that statements of witnesses favorable to the charged 
party were disclosable because there was no danger of retalia-
tion .132 The court viewed the Board's refusal to release any state-
ments as overly restrictive and inconsistent with the FOIA's pur-
pose of providing the fullest possible disclosure. 133 The Board's 
policy of releasing statements only after the witness had testified 
would preclude Temple-Eastex from ever seeing statements that 
12
• Id. at 2074-75. Other courts have applied this reasoning. See Robbins Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2586 (N.D. Ala. 1976); Barnes & Noble Bookstores v. NLRB, 92 
.LRRM 2169 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); NLRB v. Schill Steel Prod., Inc., 408 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1%9). 
125 92 LRRM at 2074-75. 
12a Id. 
127 Id. at 2075. 
128 90 LRRM 3138 (D.S.C. 1975). 
'
29 /d. at3143-44. 
130 Id. at 3144. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra. 
13
' 92 LRRM 2915 (E.D. Tex. 1976). 
132 Id. at 2918. Here the employer was the charged party. The statements released to the 
employer were made by nonunion employees and were favorable to the employer, so there 
was no danger of retaliation by either the union or the employer. 
133 Id. at 2917. 
SPRING 1977] The FOIA & NLRB Discovery 493 
might aid its case, since the Board would never call a witness who 
would testify on behalf of the charged party .134 Finally, the court 
observed that it could determine whether the statements were 
favorable or hostile by an in camera inspection. 
The expansive interpretation given exemption 7(A) by the courts 
in cases such as Title Guarantee and Climax Molybdenum conflicts 
with the purpose of the 1974 Amendments. The legislative history 
of exemption 7(A) does not support the reliance of these courts on 
the distinction between open and closed investigatory files as the 
basis for deciding whether disclosure is allowable. In discussing 
the Amendments, the only factor which Senator Hart referred to 
was whether the files would interfere with enforcement proceed-
ings if released. 135 In some cases it is possible to disclose open files 
without interfering with enforcement proceedings, or damaging an 
agency's case in court. 136 The simplistic dichotomy between open 
and closed investigatory files does not account for the effect of 
disclosure on the interests of the parties. 137 This distinction also 
fails to account for the identity of witnesses and the varying con-
tents of their statements. 138 
The rule that open investigatory files are per se nondisclosable 
also renders much of the 1974 Amendments ineffective. FOIA 
cases were intended to be decided on a case-by-case basis, 139 and if 
courts automatically deny disclosure of every open file, then the 
merits of any particular case are not considered. 140 The per se rule 
also precludes the effective use of the in camera inspections, which 
are expressly permitted by the 1974 Amendments. 141 The provision 
for in camera inspections implicitly underscores the importance of 
a case-by-case approach to the FOIA; if documents were to be 
generically categorized as per se disclosable or nondisclosable, 
there would be little use for in camera inspection. 
It has been argued that courts cannot fully consider each FOIA 
suit individually, and that in the interest of economy and efficiency 
they must either apply a rule allowing a quick disposition of the 
case, 142 or defer to the authority of the respective agencies to 
determine the merits of each case. 143 However, the purpose of the 
13• Jd. 
135 120 CONG. REC. 517,033 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Hart). 
136 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2072 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Temple-
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2915 (E.D. Tex. 1976); Deering-Milliken, Inc. v. Nash, 90-
LRRM 3138 (D.S.C. 1975). 
137 See notes 23-51 and accompanying text supra. 
138 See notes 48-51 and accompanying text supra. 
139 120 CONG. REc. 517,034 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Hart). 
1
•
0 Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 490 (2d Cir. 1976). 
141 See notes 99-100 and accompanying text supra. 
142 See Goodfriend Western Co. v. Fucns, 535 F.2d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 1976). 
143 See _Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 3466 (10th Cir. 1976). _ 
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1967 FOIA was to remove from the agencies the power to deter-
mine the disclosability of their own files. 144 The elimination of the 
inflexible rules that summarily removed FOIA suits from the 
courts was another purpose of the 1974 Amendments. 145 
Moreover, the fear that the courts will be flooded with FOIA cases 
is groundless. Even if courts decide each FOIA case on its merits, 
a standard will evolve that will be perceptible to the NLRB and 
counsel for charged parties. Once this happens, the parties will 
know under what circumstances witness statements will not be 
available, and thus will seldom resort to litigation to contest in-
stances of nondisclosure. 
The other portions of exemption 7 relied upon by the Board to 
protect the confidentiality of its files have played a less prominent 
role in litigation. Although the Board has often sought to employ 
them, the courts have generally found these portions of exemption 
7 inapplicable without extensive discussion. 146 Exemption 7(C) 
provides that investigatory files compiled for law enforcement 
purposes may be withheld where disclosure of the requested mater-
ial will constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy .147 The At-
torney General of the United States has taken the position that 
exemption 7(C) applies only to statements containing information 
relating to purely personal matters such as marital status, medical 
conditions and family disputes. 148 In FOIA suits involving the 
NLRB 149 as well as other agencies, 150 the courts have uniformly 
agreed with this interpretation. In Marathon LeTourneau Com-
pany v. NLRB, 151 the court rejected the Board's contention that 
"the right to privacy includes the right to select the people to 
whom one will communicate his ideas. " 152 The court relied on the 
personal data standard153 adopted by the Attorney General and 
other courts. 154 
144 See notes 52-61 and accompanying text supra. 
145 120 CoNG. REc. 517,040 (1974). Senator Hart stated, "Until about 9 or 12 months ago 
the courts consistently had approached [FOIA cases] on a balancing basis, which is exactly 
what this amendment seeks to do." Id. 
146 See generally Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 45 
U.S.L.W. 3251 (1976); Amerace Corp. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 3497 (W.D. Tenn. 1976); Jamco 
Int'I, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 LRRM 2447 (N.D. Okla. 1976); Local 30, United Slate, Tile, and 
Composition Roofers v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
147 5 U .S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (Supp. V 1975). 
148 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL 's MEMORANDUM ON THE 1974 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 9-10 (1975). 
149 Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2645 (W.D. Tenn. 1976); Marathon 
LeToumeau Co. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Cessna Aircraft Co. v. 
NLRB, 405 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Kan. 1975). 
150 See Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974); Rural Hous. Alliance 
v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
151 414 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D. Miss. 1976). 
152 Id. at 1084. 
153 /d. 
154 See notes 147-48 and acco.mpanying text supra. 
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Exemption 7(0) allows investigatory files of law enforcement 
agencies to be withheld from disclosure if they have been gathered 
from confidential sources .155 The purpose of the confidential 
source exemption is to protect the identity of the witness, not the 
content of the statement. In order to sustain a claim under exemp-
tion 7(0), prevailing authority required an agency to present evi-
dence that the requested information was received by the agency 
under an express assurance of confidentiality .156 Courts have usu-
ally held that information obtained from "confidential sources" 
will never be released, even after the investigation has been con-
cluded and all litigation ended. 157 Since witness statements must be 
revealed after testimony, they should not be "confidential" under 
this definition. Nevertheless, in Baptist Memorial Hospital v. 
NLRB, 158 the court allowed the Board to withhold statements of 
witnesses who had been told that their statements would not be 
released. The court stated, however, that if the Board called any of 
the witnesses who had been promised confidentiality, the state-
ments would be given to the charged party after the witnesses had 
testified. This decision raises several questions. The Board has 
never empowered its field examiners to guarantee anonymity to 
witnesses. 159 If the courts enforce unauthorized grants of confiden-
tiality, they are rewarding the dishonesty of agents. On the other 
hand, if the courts decline to enforce these unauthorized guaran-
tees of confidentiality, witnesses may be deceived into giving 
statements they would not have otherwise provided. In dealing 
with promises of confidentiality authorized by the Board, the 
courts are faced with a more difficult question. If the courts were to 
deny disclosure of witness statements elicited by such promises of 
confidentiality, the Board would circumvent the FOIA entirely by 
assuring all potential witnesses that their statements are confiden-
155 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (Supp. V 1975). Exemption 7(0) provides: "This section shall 
not apply to matters that are-
... (7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the 
extent that the production of such records would 
... (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source ... " (emphasis added). 
156 Marathon LeToumeau Co. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Local 30, 
United Slate, Tile, and Composition Roofers v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa,. 1976); 
Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 534 
F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3251 (1976); Cessna Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 405 
F. Supp. 1042 (D. Kan. 1975); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Nash, 90 LRRM 3138 (D.S.C. 1975). 
In Title Guarantee, the Second Circuit noted with approval the district court's application of 
exemption 7(0). 534 F.2d at 489 n.11. 
157 Marathon LeToumeau Co. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074, 1084 (S.D. Miss. 1976). 
158 92 LRRM 2645 (W.D. Tenn. 1976). . 
159 Fuselier & Moeller, NLRB Investigatory Records: Disclosure Under the Freedom of 
Information Act, 10 U. R1cH. L. REv .. 541, 552-53 (1976). 
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tial. 160 There may be times when the Board has a legitimate interest 
in the confidentiality of witness statements, 161 but the courts rather 
than the Board should determine when the Board's interests out-
weigh the interests of the party seeking disclosure. 162 Strict adher-
ence to the offer of confidentiality standard applied in Baptist 
Memorial invites abuse of the exemption, evades the purpose of 
the 1974 Amendments, and may unnecessarily compromise the 
rights of those requesting disclosure. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Traditionally the NLRB has denied requests for discovery in 
unfair labor practice cases, and courts have been willing to enforce 
the Board's regulations concerning discovery. Since the enactment 
of the Freedom of Information Act in 1967, the Board has con-
tinued to contest requests for information by relying upon exemp-
tions 5 and 7. In FOIA suits involving the NLRB many courts have 
applied a rule which defines NLRB investigatory files as non-
disclosable per se. 
The intent of the 1967 FOIA and its 1974 Amendments was to 
encourage full agency disclosure by declaring that all information is 
to be released unless covered by a specific exemption. The burden 
rests with the agency to prove the applicability of the exemption, 
and courts are to decide each request for information on a case-
by-case basis. The influential decision of Title Guarantee Company 
v. NLRB, however, has led many courts to ignore congressional 
intent and cursorily dismiss all FOIA suits against the NLRB by 
application of the per se nondisclosable rule. Courts should 
reexamine the legislative history of the FOIA and seek to imple-
ment its purpose more fully by evaluating requests individually 
without resort to mechanical rules. Such rules neither require 
agencies to meet their statutorily prescribed burden of proof, nor 
do they allow full consideration of the public's interest in obtaining 
government information. 
1
•
0 Id. at 553. 
161 See notes 41-47 and accompanying text supra. 
162 See notes-52-61 and accompanying text supra. 
-Del Dillingham 
